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COMMENTS
TORTS-LIMITATIONS ON THE
BIGHTS OF PRIVACY-
PRIVILEGE TO REPORT MATTERS OF
PUBLIC INTEREST*
One would suppose that a new tort emerging full blown from
the minds of legal theoreticians and duly certified by the courts
would be a model of judicial clarity and precision. But the right
of privacy,' which started out that way, had been a source of
confusion for seventy years when Dean Prosser pronounced it not
one protected interest but four.2 The torts committed in the
invasion of these rights of privacy are: Type-I: Physical in-
trusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion. Type-II: Public disclosure
of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. Type-IlI:
Publicity casting a false light upon the plaintiff. Type-IV:
Commercial appropriation of the plaintiff's name or picture.
This comment is concerned with limitations on the second of
these-public disclosure of private facts.
I. Tim PrivACY CoNTINuum, PRE-HM
The defendant in every Type-II privacy action has published3
information about the plaintiff which the plaintiff had not
wanted the public to know. Compressed to its analytical es-
sentials, the common law rule has been that such a publication
is actionable unless it is "of legitimate public interest."
* Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F.Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
1. Maybe it should be called the right-of-privacy-No. 1. It was first ad-
vocated by Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Ev.
193 (1890), and was judicially recognized in Pavesich v. New England
Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905). In three of its four branches
this right, protected in tort, might be thought of as "the right not to be
publicized." The right-of-privacy-No. 2, by comparison, is a miscellany of
specific provisions, penumbras, and emanations found in, cast by, and radiating
from the Bill of Rights. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Right-of-privacy-No. 2 seems to restrict only governmental action.
2. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. Rnv. 383 (1960). The four can equally
well be considered sub-interests since they are surely different manifestations
of the individual's single interest in maintaining the dignity of his own per-
sonality against intrusion from whatever quarter. See generally Bloustein,
Privacy as an Aspect of Hionan Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 962 (1964).
3. Publication is usually more extensive than in a defamation action. See
Prosser, supra note 2, at 393 nn.94, 95.
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To help -with the analysis, let an "event" be thought of as any
coherent set of facts concerning the plaintiff.4 An event may
thus consist of something the plaintiff was, something he did, or
something that was done to him. The only qualification is that
the facts comprising the event belong together so as to make
sense. Every imaginable event, every coherent set of facts about
the plaintiff, can be assigned to a point on a line representing a
continuum of such events. The further left, say, that one goes on
the line, the more newsworthy, and therefore less deserving of
privacy, are the events found there. Conversely, the farther
right that an event is located on the line, the less newsworthy
and more deserving of privacy it is.
Over the years since Warren and Brandeis wrote their famous
article,5 such an imaginary continuum was created by the courts
and then laboriously divided in two. On one side of the judi-
cially drawn bisector which divides this continuum are events
which have been adjudged more private than public in nature.
Such events are unpublishable. If the defendant does publish a
report concerning an event falling on this side of the continuum,
the plaintiff will be permitted to recover in a Type-fl privacy
action.
But on the other side of the bisector lie events which, in some
sense, are more public than private. These events might be
called newsworthy.6 The defendant may publish such events
with impunity. Thus, the privilege to publish a report of an
event falling on the public side of the bisector does not depend on
whether the event has been placed far into the privileged zone
or only just inside it. The defendant is no more liable for pub-
lishing an event which falls barely to the left of the bisector,
where public and private are almost in balance, than he is for
publishing an event lying far to the left side and thus highly
public in nature. Conversely, if an event is more private than
public, even if only an iota more, liability attaches to its pub-
lication.
Two questions have arisen concerning this right-of-privacy
continuum. The first is: Who gets to make the assignment to
4. An event must be a true set of facts. If the defendant publishes falsehood
instead of fact, then the plaintiff has a Type-III action for having been placed
in a false light. (He may also have a defamation action if the other elements
of that tort are present.)
5. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1.
6. As used in this article, "newsworthy" means only this: An event is
newsworthy if a court, for whatever reason, has chosen to deem the pub-
lication of the event privileged in a Type-II action.
1968]
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a point on the privacy continuum of an event whose publication
is being litigated? And the second: What criteria are used in
making this assignment?
The first one is easily answered. The courts, not the publishing
companies which usually defend Type-I actions, decide whether
an event is newsworthy and hence publishable or not. The sug-
gestion7 may be true that in reality the defendant publishers
often usurp this function from deferent courts. Nevertheless, the
courts retain the final say and can always reject the publisher's
contention that the event published was newsworthy.8
The second question is more substantial: What criteria have
the courts used in deciding where to place an event on the
privacy continuum? The answer seems to be that in almost
every case the courts, explicitly or implicitly, have balanced two
competing interests. One is the interest of the individual in
maintaining his personality inviolate, free from the glare of
unwanted publicity, safe from the gawking masses-left alone.
Opposed is society's interest in making available for public
inspection the details of every event of social significance. The
greater the social significance, the greater the interest in publi-
cation.9
The cases reveal, however, that the courts would rather declare
an event automatically newsworthy and hence publishable with-
out having to balance interests overtly, and they do so whenever
possible. Balancing is usually dispensed with, for example, if
the court can satisfy itself that the plaintiff should not recover
because he has impliedly waived his right of privacy. The courts
have commonly felt that one "who asks for and desires public
recognition"'0 thereby surrenders any claim to Type-I privacy.
Public men,"' voluntary litigants,12 boxers, 13 perpetrators of a
7. Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?,
31 LUw & CoiNTiP. PRoD. 326, 336 (1966).
8. Although most courts have regarded the issue as one of law, the decision
has sometimes been left to the jury. E.g., Blount v. TD Publishing Corp., 77
N.M. 384, 423 P.2d 421 (1966).
9. A well considered identification of the social interest involved is found
in Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1958). In brief it is
"the interest of the public in the free dissemination of the truth and unimpeded
access to news ... ." 251 F.2d at 450.
10. Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 64 F. 280, 282 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894).
11. Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (1907).
12. Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn.
1948).
13. Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d 704, 211 P.2d 320 (1949).
[Vol. 21
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hoax,14 criminals,15 movie stars,16 sports figures,17 wives of fa-
mous authors,18 Grand Exalted Rulers of Grand Lodges,19 and
stripteasers20 all are said to have elected a course of conduct
which naturally brings them before the public eye. By so doing
they are regarded as having forfeited the privacy protection
enjoyed by "the great mass of citizens who are entitled . . . to
be let alone."2'
The courts began grounding summary judgments for the
defendant upon the implied waiver rationale in an era which
predated the contemporary emphasis on the value of unfettered
speech. A balancing act in that day would have pitted the
individual's acknowledged interest in public-be-damned privacy
against an anemic version of the social interest served by pub-
lication.22 The courts therefore resorted to basic notions of con-
sent derived from the law of contracts to explain the denial of
recovery. Since the plaintiff knew what he was doing when he
engaged in attention-getting activity, he could not complain
of the predictable publicity. Although the waiver rationale has
been condemned as superficial 2 and fallacious 24 it stubbornly
retains favor in the appellate opinions. Its forthright simplicity
provides an appealing contrast to the sophisticated, uncertain
alternative of balancing interests. It is a hearty specimen of
common-sense jurisprudence and deserves to survive, as it surely
will.
But when the waiver rationale is not available, the courts must
declare some other standard for adjudicating as newsworthy or
private the event whose publication is complained of. The most
common formulation relied on is some variation of the following:
Liability attaches to the publication unless the event published
14. Smith v. NBC, 138 Cal. App. 2d 807, 292 P.2d 600 (1956).
15. Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. 2d 315, 239 P2d 876 (1952).
16. Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 733, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 405 (1962).
17. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877, 221
N.E.2d 543 (1966).
18. Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 726, 268 N.Y.S.2d
531 (Sup. Ct), affd, 25 App. Div. 2d 719, 269 N.Y.S. 2d 366 (1966).
19. Wilson v. Brown, 189 Misc. 79, 73 N.Y.S2d 587 (Sup. Ct 1947).
20. Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 14 Ga. App. 367, 151 S.E2d 496 (1966).
21. Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F.2d 467, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
22. Warren and Brandeis wrote their seminal article orl privacy in the
context of the "yellow journalism" of the day. Warren & Brandeis, supra
note 1, at 196; Prosser, supra note 2, at 383.
23. Note, Right of Privacy vs. Free Press: Suggested Resolution of Con-
flicting Values, 28 IND. L.J. 179, 182 (1953).
24. Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 MICH L. Rnv. 526, 556 (1941).
1968]
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is of "legitimate public interest. '25 It is true that the courts
frequently assign great weight to the objective fact that the
public may have a genuine desire to learn about the kind of
event involved, thus making it appear that mere public curiosity
is the test of newsworthiness. Sometimes the court may even
omit the word "legitimate" from the formulation of its standard,
thus giving some illusion of objectivity. Nevertheless, it is
doubtful whether any court has ever interpreted its function
in a Type-II case to be that of a pollster whose job it is to
register public opinion.28 Even the cases which come closest to
adopting a purely mechanical criterion for pegging an event
on the privacy continuum usually contain an escape clause
phrased in clearly normative language2 7 The courts have in-
sisted on confirming for themselves the legitimacy of the public's
curiosity, not merely its existence, before pronouncing an event
newsworthy.
As noted above, the legitimacy of a given publication has been
determined, absent waiver, by weighing the public's interest in
learning about the published event against the individual's
interest in keeping it to himself. In the tradition of the common
law, the courts have insisted on a case-by-case approach to the
problem of determining newsworthiness,)28 yet the results at the
appellate level have been surprisingly one-sided. In general the
courts have been quite reluctant to override the publisher's
claim of privilege. Among the events that have been found
worthy of publication are: a woman's conduct during the mur-
der of her husband on the street;29 plump women reducing in a
gym with humorous apparatus ;8o performance of the Indian rope
25. E.g., Buzinski v. DoAll Co., 31 Ill. App. 2d 191, 175 N.E2d 577 (1961);
Themo v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d
753 (1940).
26. Were it otherwise, the very fact that publication had been judged
profitable by the publisher would almost automatically evidence the popular
curiosity necessary to establish the newsworthiness of the event and thus
invoke the privilege. See Note, The Right of Privacy: Normative-Descriptive
Confusion in the Defense of Newsworthiness, 30 CHr. L. REv. 722, 725 (1963).
27. See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
"Revelations may be so intimate and so unwarranted in view of the victim's
position as to outrage the community's notions of decency." 113 F.2d at 809.
Revelations might thus be so shocking as to deserve liability even though
public curiosity would otherwise protect their publication.
28. See Sweenek v. Pathe News, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 746 (E.D.N.Y. 1936);
Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., 108 Cal. App. 2d 191, 238 P.2d 670 (1951).
29. Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W.2d 972 (1929).
30. Sweenek v. Pathe News, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 746 (E.D.N.Y. 1936).
[VbI. 21
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trick;81 public suicide;82 dissuasion from public suicide;33 a
gambling raid in which plaintiff was an innocent bystander; 4
police treatment of a prisoner; sr the appearance of a murder
victim ;36 the appearance of a murder victim's family ; 7 birth of
a child to a twelve-year-old girl;38 and marriage.39 The cases
clearly show that an event whose publication provides back-
ground information or diversion in the manner of many feature
stories may also qualify as newsworthy just as may articles
about events more conventionally deemed "news.2
40
If the plaintiff is to overcome the courts' natural inclination
to declare newsworthy whatever appears in the press, he must
show an exceptionally strong interest in keeping the event from
the public eye. At the least he must show that the publication
would have seriously offended a reasonable person in his po-
sition.41 In Melvin V. Reid42 recovery was permitted for the
distribution of a film depicting the plaintiff's former life of
debauchery. The plaintiff, whose friends were unaware of her
past, had mended her ways and was living respectably when the
film revealed her identity. The court was clearly impressed by
the fact that her rehabilitation could have been fatally damaged
by the publication.
The plaintiff in Cason v. BaskiA3 was the subject of a charac-
ter portrayal in the defendant's novel. Although the image con-
veyed was that of an unusual and colorful personality, the court
felt that any public interest in plaintiff's idiosyncracies fell
short of legitimacy. The plaintiff's life had been obscure and
unnotable until the publication of the character sketch.
31. Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y.S. 382 (Sup. Ct.
1937).
32. Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P2d 491
(1939). The court added the waiver rationale as an afterthought.
33. Samuel v. Curtis Publishing Co., 122 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
34. Theino v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27
N.E.2d 753 (1940); Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d
34 (Fla. 1955).
35. Hull v. Curtis Publishing Co., 182 Pa. Super. 86, 125 A.2d 644 (1956).
36. Waters v. Fleetwood, 212 Ga. 161, 91 S.E2d 344 (1956).
37. Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 251 F2d 447 (3d Cir. 1958).
38. Meetze v. AP, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956). South Carolina has
so far been a model jurisdiction in the privacy tort area though the cases are
few. See Holloman v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 192 S.C. 454, 7 S.E.2d 169
(1940); Frith v. AP, 176 F. Supp. 671 (E.D.S.C. 1959).
39. Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 190 Pa. Super. 528, 154 A.2d 422 (1959).
40. Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 1958) ; Goelet
v. Confidential, Inc., 5 App. Div. 2d 226, 171 N.Y.S2d 223 (1958); Lahiri v.
Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y.S. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
41. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652D (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967).
42. 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
43. 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1945).
19681
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 9
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss1/9
SoUTH CAROLiNA LAw Rnmw
In Brent8 v. Morga 4 recovery was allowed when the de-
fendant posted a notice in his place of business announcing that
the plaintiff had failed to pay his debts. There was no public
interest in such a publication while the plaintiff's interest in
preventing it was considerable.
To summarize the privilege as it stood before the 1967 case
of Time, Inc., v. i1, 411 no liability accompanied the reporting
of al event so long as it was adjudicated newsworthy. News-
worthiness automatically attached to events involving public
figures on the theory of waiver and to other events commonly
reported in the press and judged on a case-by-case basis by
balancing the interests involved. While the plaintiff in a Type-
II privacy action often lost since he was either a public figure
or a participant in an event of public significance, he usually did
get to the jury if he could avoid the pale of those two rubrics.
II. Tum PRIvAcy CoNTnmx, PosT-Hi71
In 1967 the United States Supreme Court accorded constitu-
tional protection under the first and fourteenth amendments
against Type-II privacy actions4 6 to reports concerning "matters
of public interest."47 Although the Justices disagreed on the
level of care required to retain the privilege in the case of a
false report, there appeared to be unanimity on the ambit of
protection for true reports. 48 If a factual publication deals with
a "matter of public interest,"49 the Court apparently will regard
it as constitutionally privileged in a Type-II action. 0
44. 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
45. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
46. Although the Court limited Hill on its facts to actions brought under N.Y.
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1948), the New York cases are freely
cited in other jurisdictions. Prosser, supra note 2, at 385-86.
47. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
48. For an unraveling of the opinions see Kalven, The Reasonable Man and
the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 267 (1967).
49. In New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Court
afforded a limited privilege to publications concerning public officials in libel
actions. In Hill the Court appeared to extend the same privilege when in-
vasion of privacy was complained of instead of libel and also to expand the
ambit of the privilege to cover reports concerning "matters of public interest."
But in the subsequent cases of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130
(1967), and AP v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), the Court reverted to the
public officials rationale, broadening it to cover "public figures." Justice Harlan
for the Court seemed to reaffirm the rationale used in Hill, nevertheless. 388
U.S. at 155 n.19. For detailed analyses see generally Hainbaugh, The Second
Front: Free Expression Vermss Individual Dignity, 9 Wm. & MARY L. REv.
126 (1967); Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill,
Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. R v. 267 (1967).
50. The privilege also obtains in a Type-III (false light) action, which
drew all the lightning in Hill.
[Vol. 21
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It is hard to say just how, or if, this part of the rule in Hill
was intended to depart from the common law rule.51 In wording
the sanction to cover matters of public interest, the Court did
leave out the requirement commonly found in the pre-Hill
opinions that the public's interest be "legitimate." If the omis-
sion of that word from the traditional common law formulation
of the privilege was purposeful, then the publication of an
event of any social significance may now be immune from Type-
II liability.52 If, instead, the individual's interest in privacy,
which used to be represented by the notion of legitimacy as a
limitation on the public's interest, was meant to be incorporated
by implication in the concept of the public interest, then the new
constitutional privilege to report the newsworthy is probably
identical to its common law predecessor.5 8 Until further clarifi-
cation arrives, it seems best to assume that the common law
privilege to publish events of legitimate public interest has been
constitutionalized intact. An event adjudged private and there-
fore unpublishable before the decision in Hill is probably still
unpublishable.54
Dieteman v. Time, Inc.,55 is an amalgam of privacy torts
Type-I and Type-fl, physical intrusion and public disclosure of
private facts. Two employees of the defendant publishing
company used a ruse to gain the plaintiff's confidence, per-
suading him that a female employee sought his healing services.
The plaintiff was in fact a quack and the employees intended to
obtain a photograph of him at work. The photograph" was
51. The Court's opinion paid no attention to this important question. Since
the Hill case involved a false publication, the Court was more interested
in how much protection to accord falsity than in how to assess newsworthiness.
52. In other words, only a publication "utterly without redeeming social
importance" would fail to find the privilege. See Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
53. It would not be very surprising if the Court were to view the individual's
interest in privacy as merely one component of the public interest. This
approach has been taken in at least one pre-Hill opinion: Gill v. Curtis Pub-
lishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630, 634 (1952).
54. Some state courts have taken a less sanguine view: "We assume, without
deciding, that some remnant of existing law still applies to commonly
recognized invasions of privacy." Hamilton v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 423 P.2d
771, 772 (Ore. 1967). Another court remarked that the previously unsettled
state of privacy law "was as nothing, now that 1967 and Time v. Hill ...
have arrived." Weeren v. Evening News Ass'n, 379 Mich. 475, 152 N.W.2d
676, 680 (1967).
55. 284 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
56. To insure a sensational picture, the female employee complained of a
lump in her breast. The resulting photo showed the plaintiff, one hand on
the agent provacateur's ailment and the other waving a wand to and fro
before a number of bottles containing diagnostic aids. Lwa, Nov. 1, 1963, at
76.
1968]
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taken surreptitiously and published as part of an eleven page
expos6 of quackery. In awarding a judgment for $1,00057 the
court rejected the contention that the plaintiff, by engaging in a
criminal act, had implicitly consented in advance to publicity
upon being found out. Nor was he a public figure at the time the
picture was taken.G8 But although it successfully disposed of
these arguments, the court failed to consider the extent of the
public interest involved in the exposure of quackery. If the
plaintiff's suit had been based solely on public disclosure of pri-
vate facts, the clear public interest involved almost certainly
would have sufficed to invoke the privilege to publish. Yet the
court, although freely citing and quoting from Type-II cases,
seems to have grounded liability more upon the physical intru-
sion involved in taking the picture than upon its publication. 9
It was the subterfuge used in gaining entrance to the plaintiff's
home and taking his picture there without his knowledge or
consent that seems to have been decisive in persuading the court
to permit recovery.60
Had the court wished to create a privilege for Type-I (in-
trusion) cases similar to that prescribed in HOf for Type-II
(disclosure) cases, it could easily have done so. 61 But for the
time being, at least, we are still legally protected in our homes
from the photographers of crusading magazines.62
57. It has been said of the privacy action that "the victim that society had in
mind when it created the means of redress was not the one who used the
remedy." Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?,
31 LAW AND CoNu P. PRoD. 326, 339 (1966).
58. "[T]he defendant, by directing attention to one who is obscure and un-
known, cannot himself create a public figure." W. Paossm, ToRTs § 112, at 845
(3d ed. 1964).
59. Nevertheless, the court refers to "the publicity required under California
law." 284 F. Supp. at 932. Publication is no part of the tort of intrusion.
Not only did the court fail to distinguish between the two branches of
the right of privacy here claimed to have been invaded, but it went on to
assert that liability could be predicated on the old Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1964). Plaintiff's counsel seems not to have raised this issue. The
court found the requisite state action in the fact that Life was in cahoots with
the District Attorney's Office, which later prosecuted for quackery. So three
separate bases for liability were advanced by the court: physical intrusion,
public disclosure of private facts, and illegal search redressable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
60. The principle is similar to that behind the exclusionary rule in criminal
cases. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) ; Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
61. Perhaps this: Physical intrusion upon the plaintiff's privacy is action-
able unless the plaintiff is engaged in a matter of legitimate public interest.
62. In Cullen v. Grove Press, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
the defendant was given permission to film the plaintiff, a guard 'at an
institution for the criminally insane, as he conducted a search of a nude
inmate. Defendant broke his promise to edit the film so as to show only the
inmate's upper extremities, then advertised the film in a lurid and sensational
[Vol. 21
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Yet the facts in the Dieteman case pose a dilemma confront-
ing courts in the privacy area generally. Moving on one front the
United States Supreme Court has at least constitutionalized, and
perhaps expanded, the common law privilege to report what is
newsworthy. The press is surely safer, in practical fact, to
pry-and-publish now than it was before Hi, while the individ-
ual's tort protection against invasion of his privacy has become
correspondingly more precarious.
But simultaneously the Court has moved to expand the bounds
of privacy when government is the i n t r u d e r.68 One hand
shoves the throttle while the other jams the brake.
In Dieteman a publishing company, the very one victorious
in HiZ, collaborated with an arm of the state government, like
the loser in &iswo&d, to intrude upon the privacy of one who
happened to be committing a criminal act. The spirit of G(iswod
was chosen over the spirit of Hill, and the plaintiff recovered
his judgment. But the dilemma inherent in distinguishing
between powerful agencies unfriendly to privacy by mechani-
cally dividing them into official and unofficial will need to be
faced more squarely in the future. Dietemann, who was con-
victed after all the publicity, would doubtless consider Time, Inc.,
the equal of many a local government.
JAms B. RioHAmsoN, JR.
manner. The court ignored the breach of faith and held the publication
privileged since conditions in the institution were of legitimate public interest.
Perhaps the public employment of the plaintiff serves to distinguish this
situation from the one in the principal case.
63. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
1968]
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 9
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss1/9
